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Abstract
This is a comment on a recent paper by A.J. Hughes Hallett. We
argue that the proposed solution to the non-cooperative bargaining pro-
blem assumes information that is not available to the players, suffers
from non-uniqueness, often fails to converge and does not satisfy the
Nash property. These claims are substantiated with numerical examples.
We also argue that the proposed solution to the problem of time incon-
sistency yields strategies that are not credible.1
1. Introduction
The Lucas (1976) critique of econometric policy evaluation has
lncreased the interest in applications of rational expectations and non-
cooperative difference~differential game theory to dynamic econometric
models, because these [echniques allow the optimal determination of
government economic policy to influence the behaviour of private sector
agents (such as trade unione or firms) and thua the policy structure of
econometric models. It is well known that economies with rational expec-
tations or open loop Stackelberg games are noncausal due to the anticí-
pation of future actions of dominant players (such as the Treasury or
the Central Bank). In such models the problem of time inconsistency
arises due to the incen[ive of dominant playera to renege on announced
strategies (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). If there are no binding commit-
ments on the part of each player and such cheating occurs all the time,
there is no incentive left for the dominant playera to renege and the
resulting actions will be optimal and conaistent (Hughes Hallett, 1984).
However, this solution to the problem of time inconsistency suffers from
the fact that the optimal strategies are not credible as the private
sector cannot be expected to believe misleading announcementa all the
time. 14ie feedback Stackelberg (leader-follower) equilibrium concept
only considers these strategies that are credible and therefore typical-
ly yielda sub-optimal strategies for the dominant players, although
these strategies are consistent by conatruction. It followe that there
is a trade-off between optimal and credible atrategies. A proper discus-
sion of this trade-off involves an analysis of the dynamic evolution of
the reputations of the players (cf. Krepa and Wilson, 1982; Barro and
Gordon, 1983; Backus and Driffill, 1984), and is beyond the scope of
this paper. The above isaues are discuased more fully in Section 3, but
before this is done we need [o discusa Hughes Hallett's (1984) approach
to the non-cooperative bargaining problem. We show in Section 2 that the
proposed solution is based upon a Stackelberg leader-leader framework
and therefore does not eatiafy the Nash property, might gíve rise to
disequilibrium situations, and suffers from non-uniquenesa. The open
loop (e.g. van der Ploeg, 1982) or feedback (e.g. Plasmana and de Zeeuw,
1980) Nash equilibria are the normal approachea to non-cooperatíve bar-2
gaining with players oE equal strenAth (Kydland, 1975) and do not suffer
from the problem of time inconsistency. Hughes Hallett (1984) criticises
these approaches, as they assume a certain naivety on the part of each
player, and therefore sugRests his "sophisticated" equilibrium for
players of equal strenl;th. The Stackelberg nature of thls solution ex-
plains why the economy is non-causal and the problem of time inconsis-
tency occurs even though the players are assumed to have equal strength.
Most of the comrnents on Hughes Hallett ( 1984) also apply to
Brandsma and Hughes Hallett (1982, 1984a, b) and Hughes Hallett and Rees
(1983, Chapter 11), but for concreteness we will concentrate our atten-
tion on the first paper (denoted by HH).3
2. "Conjectural variations" in an open loop Nash equilibrium?
In sections 3 and 5.1 of HH a dynamic difference game is conver-
ted to a static game by stacking the policy instruments for all time
periods into one vector. Such a solution procedure corresponds to an
open loop Nash equilibrium (Kydland, 1975, pp. 327-330; Ba~ar and
Olsder, 1982, p. 245), because the information set avaílable to each
player at any time of the planning period is the information available
prior to the planning exercise. The open loop Nash equillbrium is con-
venient to calculate, but assumes that players do not have access to the
current state of the economy. This is unrealistic and HH would have
benefited from calculating feedback or closed loop with memory Nash
equilibria (e.g. Barar and Olsder, 1982, Chapter 6; de Zeeuw, 1984,
Chapter 4) which have more satisfac[ory information patterns.
The conventional definition of a strategy is a mapping from the
information space to the action space, where the action space is the
Cartesian product of the sets of possible policy instruments at each
point of tíme and, for the open loop Naeh equilibrium, the information
space is the Cartesian product of the set of possible initial states of
the economy. HH starts off with strategies where the information space
consists of the action spaces and the reaction curves, or conjectural
variations, of the rival players. The problem with this approach is that
the information sets the playera are supposed to have access to are in
practice never available, so that the game cannot be played. For exam-
ple, if each player has two policy instrumen[s, then the information set
must contain the four reaction coefEicients of each r1va1 which are
simply not observable. Furthermore, there is some confueion between the
iterations of the HH algorithm, designed to suggest new directions in
the search for optimal decisions, and the time structure of the game.
Presumably, the iterations occur in notional tíme whereas the economy
evolves in real time but this sheds further doubt on how the game might
be played in practice.
The conceptual problems discussed above are quite serious, be-
cause ít can be shown that the HH set of "Nash" solutions do not neces-
sarily give a unique set of actions, the iterations do not necessarily
converge and the resulting outcomea are not in Nash equilibrium. Most of4
these problems arise from introducing information that is not available.
Since our allegations are quite severe, it is useful to turn to a more
detailed discussion of the HH approach and to provide the reader with
some numerical examples to substantiate our claima.
Any dynamic econometric model can be cast into a final form
model (e.g. Theil, 1964), that isl)
y 3 R(1)x(1) f
R(2)x(2)
t s (1)
where y, x(1), x(2) and s are vectors (stacked for all periods of the
finite planning horizon) of endogeneoua variables, policy instruments of
player 1, policy instruments of player 2 and known uncontrollable exoge-
neous shocks. The matrices R(1) and R(2) are known matricea for players
1 and 2, which are block-triangular for economies without rational ex-
pectations of future events. (hir attention is restricted to determinis-
tic games, because the discussion of first-period certainty equivalence
and asymmetric information in Section 4 of HH is uncontroversial and a
proper account of experimentation, probing and learning of the R(1)
would complicate matters unnecessarily. The objective of player i is to
minimise a quadratic welfare loss function of the form2)




where z(i) a(y',x i)'. There are no direct externalities in (2), so
that the only interactions between the players
of on
ry) Nash
w(2)(x(1)~,x(2)~) c w(Z)(x(1)~,x(Z)), d x(2)
1) We will stick as close as possible to the notation in HH.
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2) The ideal values y(i) and x~i~ can be omitted without loes of gene-
rality due to the presence of q .5
so that there is no individual tncentive for any player to deviate Erom
the equilíbrium. HH caLis strateRles that satisfy (3) privately optimal
decisions for the non-cooperative Nash game, whilst one of our objecti-
ves is to demonstrate that the HH equilibrium concept with conjectural
variations does not satisfy (3).
The conventional Nash equilibrium assumes that each player ie
naive and does not consider the reactions of its rivala to its own ac-
tions, that is player i assumes that ax(j)~ax(i) a 0, j~ i, in the cal-
culation of its optimal strategies (e.g. Kydland, 1975; van der Ploeg,
1982). This yields the optimal decísions conditional on the actions of
the rivals,
~ stR(j)x(j)
x(i) - - [G(i)' Q(i) G(i)]-1 Gíi)'{Q(1) (i)
- 0 0 0
.......... f q } (4)
0
~
where G~i -[R i : I]' and similarly for player j. The open loop Nash
equilibrium satisfies (3) and is calculated as the intersection of the
reaction curves (4), tha[ is
R(2)
G(1)' Q(1) G(1) : G(1)' Q(1) ....
0 0 : 0 ~
..................:...................
R(1) :
G(2)' Q(2) .... : Gí2)' Q(2) Gí2)
(5)




G(z)'{Q(2) .s } q(2)}
0
The nonlinear extension of this open loop Nash equilibrium has been
developed by Rustem and Zarrop (1979) and van der Ploeg (1982). An6
application to the analysis of conflict between government, trade uníons
and firms within the context of a multisectoral dynamic model of the
U.K. economy (see Barker et al., 1980) is also reported in van der Ploeg
(1982), so that interestin~ applications to large-scale, nonlinear eco-
nometric models are quite feasible.
HH argues that the open loop Nash equilibrium is inconsistent,
because eaCh player computes an optimal reaction to his opponents' deci-
sions whilst ignoring the counterreactiona of hia opponents who are
doing the same. But zero conjectural variations are the essence of the
Nash concept! Let us nevertheless consider the "Nash" approach adopted
in HH. Instead of adopting zero conjectural variations, player 1 has
formed an estimate of the reactions of ite rivals, say ax(~)~ax(1) z
D(~) ~ 0, even though these reaction coefficienta are not observable to
player i. It follows that, instead of (S), the "sophiaticated" equili-
brium must satisfy
(2)




G(2)' Q(2) .. : G(2)' Q(2) G(02)
0. .
(6)
G(1)' {Q(1) .slt q(1)}
oJ ......................
G(z)' {Q(2) .s f q(2)}
0
where G(1) -{(R(i)tR(~)D(~))' : I}'. It is ( due to the ambiguous infor-
mation structure) not clear where the conjectural variations, D(~), come
from, but HH suggests an iterative scheme in notional time for finding a
~ ~
fixed point between D(1)~ D(2), x(1) and x(2) . The proposed scheme is
based upon the fact that any conjectural variation at notional time simplles a new conjectural variation at notional time sfl, that is
(j)
D(i) --IG(i)~ Q(i) G(i)j-1 G(i)~ Q(i) R...




where G(i) (i) (j) (j)
s -{(R fR Ds ) ' : I}', and using ( 6) implies new actions
for the players at notional time s~-1. Upon substitution of the itera[ive
scheme (7) into ( 6) (or, to be more preclse, equation (14) of HH), one
obtatns after conslderable algebraic manípulation
R(j)
x(i) - -{G(i)' Q(i)[G(i) .... (D(j) - D(j))~}-1
sf 1 s s ~ sf 1 s
G(i)'{Q(i) I[s -t R(j)(F(j)s f k(j))~ ~ q(i)1
s '~ sfl sfl
for i,j ~ 1,2 and i~ j, where
(F(i) : k(i)) ~-(G(i)~ Q(i) G(i))-1G(i)~{Q(i) L II~ q(i)}. st 1. s-F~1 s 0 s U
(8)
Equation (8) gives the itera[ive scheme directly in terms of the deci-
sions of the players.i) A fixed point for the conjectural variations of
player 1, say D~2), satisfies
D(2) ~ n(2)ID(1)(D(2))~ ~ ~
and similarly for player 2. HH gives an algorithm for calculating the
~ ~ ~
fixed-point equilibríum, x(1) - x(1) (D(1),D(2)), x(2) ~ ~ ~
1) It corresponds to equation (16) of HH and corrects some non-trivial
mistakes in that equation. We hope that (16) was not used to calculate
the empirical results in HH.8
~
x(2) (D(1),D(2)), D(1) and D(2), but does not discuss issues of unique- ~ ~ ~ ~
ness or convergence of the iterations defined by (7) and (8).1) This is
a pity, since we show in the examples below that there are typically
many different fixed-point equilibria and some of them need not be
stable. Thia seems, qulte apart from the curíous information require-
ments, a serious criticism of the proposed solution concept. Further-
more, we will show that the set of fixed points defined by (9) does not
only contain multiple "Nash" equilibria but that none of them need
satísfy the Nash property (3) and none of the players need necessarily
obtain improvements in their welfare.
Example 1(Hughes Hallett, 1984, pp. 389-390):
Consider the scalar game y~ x(1) f x(2) - 1 and
w(i) - Y2 f x(i)2, so that R(i) a 1, s--1, Q(i) ~ 2I and q(i) a 0. The
Nash equilibrium ( 3) follows from the intersection of the reactíon cur-
ves (4) x(1)~ ~(1-x(~))~2, so that x(1)~ - 3, y~ a- 3 and w(i)~ a 2~9.
This also follows directly from ( 6) or (8) ( or from ( 16) in HH), because
C(1) ' (1) - - 1 (i) - - 1 0 -(1 1) , F1 2, D1 2 and therefore the outcome of ite-
t f
ration 1, xii) - 3, is the Nash solution. HH argues that x(1) a x(2) s
f
0.4 is a better solution, because y} a-0.2, w(i) ~ 0.2 and therefore
gives a l0i improvement for both players. This is a peculiar argument,
because
w(2)} a 0.2 ~(0.4 f x(2) - 1)2 f x(2)2 a w(2)(0.4.x(2))
for 0.2 ~ x(2) ~ 0.4. If x(1) - 0.4, then 0.2 is not the minimum loss
t
for player 2, but 0.18 is for x(2) - 0.3! x(1) is therefore not a Nash
equilibrium solution. It is well known that, given the presence of ex-
ternalities, it is possible to find Pareto improvements over the Nash
1) We note that the application to analysing conflict between government
and labour within the context of the Klein I model, reported in Section
8 of HH, stops after the first iteration of the algorithm.9
outcomes but these will not be individually rational in the sense of
(3)! If the players were "sophísticated" in the HH aense, the reaction
~
curves at notional time s are given by xei) s(1-x(j))(1tDgj))~(2tDéj))
and íteration ( 7) becomes U(i) ~ F(i) R(j) --(1tD(j))~(2tD(j)). Star- sfl sfl s s
ting with Dii) -- 2 one finds that after another iteration D2j) ~- 3,
so that x21) s 4, y2 -- 2 and w2i) ~ 16 , Both players end up with
worse pay-offs than in the conventional Naeh equilibrium and it is
therefore not clear what is meant with the "down-hill search directions"
of the HH algorithm. There are two fixed points corresponding to (9),
~
D~i) z- 2 f 2 J5, which give rise to the multiple equilibria x(i) 3
~
1} 1
J5, y~ -- 1 JS and w(i) - 1} 1 d5 g 0.28 or 0.72. Each of the 2 10 5 2 10
fully iterated HH solutions produce worse results for both players than
the conventional Nash equilibrium ( s~l). Furthermore they do not satisfy
the Nash property ( 3), because it can be shown that
~
w(1) -
2} 10 J5 ~ w(1)(x(1)~ 2 f 10 J5)
for, say, x(1) ~ 4 t 20 J5. The HH solution has little to do with the
Nash equilibrium solution, but is much closer in spirit to the Stackel-
berg leader-leader situation and it is therefore no surprise that the
players end up worse than with zero conjectural variations. Finally it
follows from S2' [D~j)] --1~(2fD~j))2 a- 2 f 2 J5 that one of the equi-
libria (D~1) '- 2} 2 J5) is stable whílst the other is unstable. It
also follows that the iterative scheme (7) proceeds in a cyclical manner
and that, if the initial conjectures are large enough (D~1) ~-2), the
iterations diverge resulting in a disequilibrium game where expectations
are never fulfilled ("price war").
Example 2 (de 7.eeuw, 1982):
Consider a symmetric game with two policy instruments for each
player and two target variables defined by R(1) ~ I, s~(1,1)',
~r
Q(i) - I and q(i) - 0. The reaction curves (4) become x(i) a10
~
- 2(x(j)~-s), so that the Nash solution (5) gives x(i) ~(- 1- 1),
3' 3 '
~
~ 1 1 i) 2
y~(3' 3)
and w - 9. The HH approach with conjectural variations
~ ~
yields the fixed-point solution characterised by x(1) ~ D~i)(x(j) fs),
D(1) - D(Z) and ~ ~
(D~i))2 f 3D~i) ~ I a 0. (9)
Despite the simple and symmetric structure of the game, it has many
solutions and it is not immediately obvious which are dominant and which
are stable. This non-uniqueness is especially in applications a very
unpleasant feature. It can be verified (after considerable algebraic
manipulation) that the HH set of solutions to (9) is given by:
(1) {D~i) - P q
-p2-3p-1
q -3-p
e P~q f 1R , q~ O,
(i)~ 1 pfq-1
x - 5 ,
-4-P-( Z} ~ Q il)
y ,
5 f 5 (Ptq)
~
3 2 ~ ~
5 5
w(i)~ ' 1 (p2t3pi-1)2 } (1 ~ 2)
10 q 5 5
- - - - [ P~- ( Z}q 1) ]
( 2tq fl) } 10 ( 2pZ~-q2t2pqf6pf2qf7)};11
~
(i) 3 1 (i) 1 1 ~ 1
(2) {D~ -(- Z f 2 JS)I' x ~(- 2} 10
J5)s, Y ~(t 5 J5)s.
~
w(i) - 2 } 10
d5};
(3)
There is clearly an infinite number of solutions! The stability of these
fixed points follows from the iterations
D(i) - -(2ItD(~))-1(ItD(j)) ~ (2IfD(~))-1 - I~
s-F 1 s s s
{D(1) - ~
- 2 t 10 JS t S J5
x(i)~ - ~ - . Y ~
- 1} 1
d5 -F 1 r t 1 d5 -f ? r 2 10 5 5 S
~




that is if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian, evaluated at D~j),
ó vec D
~~ - -{(2ItDsj))'-1 Q (21i.Dsj))-1} (11)
s
are inside the unit circle the local stability of the i terative scheme
in (10) in the neighbourhood of D~~) is guaranteed. The eigenvalues for
the three sets of fixed points are given by {- 2 f 2 J5, - 2- 2 J5,
1,1}, {- 2 t 2 J5, 4 times} and {- 2 t 2 d5, - 2- 2 J5, 1,1}, respec-
tively, so that p~i) ~(- 2 f~ J5)I is the only stable fixed point. The
stable solution dominates all members of the third class of solutions,
~
because the lowest possible welfare losa, w(i) ~ 20 } ZO J5
for r a12
2 t 2 J5, is greater than the welfare loss the players incur under the
~
stable solution, w(i) 3 2- iU J5. However, the stable solution of the
HH set of solutions produces worse pay-offs than the Nash pay-offs.
Finally, the only point that does satisfy ( 3), i.e. the Nash equilibrium
~
x(i) -- 3 s, is not an element of the HH set of "Nash" solutions.l)
For the two examples discussed above, it turned out that there
was only one stable solution out of an infinite number of possible HH
solutions. It seems that what is required to establish the HH sophisti-
ca[ed outcomes for non-cooperative decision making as a sensible concept
is a general theorem that proves the uniqueness of a stable solution.
Until this has been achieved, and it is not clear whether it can be
achieved, some doubt remains with respect to the algorithm. In any case,
it suggests [hat the user of the HH approach must perturb a proposed
solution in order to establish the stability of conjectures.
The criticisms of the HH solution levied in this section are
quite independent of the debate on time inconaistency and open loop vs.
feedback Nash equilibria and apply to static as well as dynamic games.
The next section of this comment discusses our díssatisfaction with the
way HH deals with the problem of time inconsistency in dynamic games.
1) This follows from the equationa x(1)~ --3 s- D~1)(x(1)~ } s) and
(9) being inconsistent.t3
3. Time inconsistency and the problem of credibility in noncausal models
Before we discuss HH's solution to the problem of time inconsis-
tency, we discuss the properties of some more conventional dynamic
games. The most straightforward solution concept is the open loop Nash
equilibrium (e.g. Kydland, 1975, Section 3; Baqar and Olsder, 1982, Sec-
tion 6.2.1; Rustem and Zarrop, 1979; van der Ploeg, 1982), which assumes
zero conjectural variations for each player (D(1) a D(2) a 0) and static
information patterns. There is no gain from re-optimiaing at a later
date and therefore no problem with time inconsistency, because none of
the players takes account of the forward-looking behaviour of its
rivals. However, the feedback Nash equilibrium (e.g. Kydland, 1975,
Section 2; Ba~ar and Olsder, 1982, Section 6.2.2; Plasmans and de Zeeuw,
1982; de Zeeuw, 1984) can yield radically different acttons as the
players are now assumed to have accesa to the current state of the eco-
nomy. Consider as an example the problem of an oligopoly with restricted
entry and exit harvesting a renewable resource with zero extraction
costs, iso-elastic demand and serially uncorrelated shocks to the
natural repleniahment rate. It can then be shown that the open loop ex-
traction rates obey Hotelling-type arbitrage rules and are therefore
efficient whilst the feedback (or credible) equilibrium leads to exces-
sive extraction rates or even extinction of the resource (van der Ploeg,
1984). Furthermore, it can be shown that, in contrast [o centralised
decision making, players will benefit from adopting closed loop policy
rules wíth memory as such rules dominate both open loop and feedback
rules (Ba~ar and Olsder, 1982, Section 6.3; de 7,eeuw, 1984, Sectton
4.3). None of these more realistic information patterns are discussed in
liH, since there attention is restricted to open loop equilibria and
dynamic programming is avoided.
Another important solution concept is the open loop Stackelberg
equilibrium (Kydland, 1975; Baqar and Olsder, 1982, Section 7.2), which
assumes zero conjectural variations for the follower (D(1) ~ 0) and
rational anticipation of the reactions of the follower by the leader
(D(2) s-~G~2)' Q(2) G~2))-l G~2)' Qj2) R(1) where Q(2) n(Qi2) : Q22))).
Tt ís weTl known that there is rin Incentive for the leader to renege on
announced strategies, because the economy it faces today depends on an-14
nouncements about future policy due to the anticipatory and non-pre-
determined behaviour of the shadow prices of the optimising follower.
Such cheating could well be beneficial to both parties. For example, a
government may announce taxation of the supply of labour tomorrow, in
order to índuce agents to accumulate capital today, and then improve
economic welfare by the taxation of capital, instead of labour, tomorrow
(Fischer, 1980). Although this dissembling behaviour of the government
could improve efficiency, there is clearly a credibility problem as the
announced strategies will, after repeated cheating, no longer be belie-
ved by the private sector. It is important to realise that the announce-
ment of contingent tax rules, rather than a discretionary sequence of
tax rates, can be beneficial even in deterministíc environments and
might, via the use of threat strategies, ensure the attainment of a com-
mand optimum. Note, however, that the announcement of such rules still
suffers from the problems of time inconsistency (see the discussion of
global Stackelberg equilibrium in Ba~ar and Olsder, 1982, Section 7.4)1)
and therefore incredibility. The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium (Baqar
and Olsder, 1982, Section 7.3) does not rely on prior commitments and is
by construction time consistent, because at each atage of the dynamic
programming process the corresponding sub-game gives a Stackelberg equi-
librium conditional on the state of the economy at that stage.2) Such a
credible equilibrium typically makes the leader worse off. Furthermore,
with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium the leader can, in contrast
with the open loop or global Stackelberg equilibrium, be worse off than
in the corresponding Nash equilibrium. Again none of these intricated
lnformational issues play a role ín Sectlons 2 and 6 of HH, since there
the focus is on the calculation of an open loop Stackelberg equilibr.iiun
1) Furthermore, the determination of such rules is typically indetermi-
nate, due to the non-classical nature of the control problem, and there-
fore requires the presence of a self-disciplined government (Papavassi-
lopoulos and Cruz, 1979).
2) Note that, unlike the case of Nash equilibrium (with linear strate-
gies), the feedback and global (or closed loop with no memory) Stackel-
berg equilibrium give different results due to the forward-looking cha-
racter of the follower's reactions.15
and issues of credibility are not discussed.l) If the models used in HH
were cast in state space rather than final form, the dynamic programming
calculations of [he feedback Stackelberg equilibrium might have been
performed and issues of credibility might have been touched upon.
Unfortunately, the discussion in HH, e.g. "The time or dynamic inconsis-
tency and suboptimality of a sequence of decisions derived by recursive
optimisation (e.g. dynamic programming) ... is well known" (HH, p. 390),
does not seem to realise that dynamic programming yields consistent
strategies by construction!
However, let us turn to the main effort of HH which seems to
provide a more sophisticated equilibrium (D(1) - D~1), D(Z) 3 D~2))
than the Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium (see Section 2). The implicit
leader-leader game in HH implies non-causality for both players, be-
cause R(i) f R(~)D~~) is no longer block-tríangular even when R(i) is,
and therefore suffers from time inconsistency. In Section 5.3 and the
Appendix of HH a solution to the problem of time inconsistency is given.
It is based on re-optimisation after each period and a policy-revision
algorithm is provided to ensure feedback for the realisation of exoge-
neous shocks (Athans, et al., 1975) and to take advantage of the incen-
tive to renege. The resulting policies are claimed to be optímal and
time consistent.2) However, we argue that these policies rely on perpe-
tual breaking of constracts and that they will therefore eventually
loose credibility and not be implemented in practice.
In summary, HH confuses issues of time inconsiatency and pro-
poses a dissembling solution to the time inconeistency problem which
lacks credibility.
1) In this context the statement "No special optimisation technique is
needed because noncausality is avoided" (HH, p. 393) is particularly
puz2ling.
2) It is shown that there exists a problem such that their equilibrium
results in a time consistent solution to that problem. The values of the
Lagrange multipliers belonging to the original game are used for the
modification. The revised problem has no interpretation and these argu-
ments have to be considered a technical gimmick.16
4. Conclusions
The HH set of sophisticated Nash equilibria relies on ambiguous
information sets, contains an infinite number of solutions but not the
Nash equílibrium, and most of these solutions are never reached as they
are unstable. Furthermore, the pay-offs to the players are typically
worse than in the conventional Nash equilibrium and the proposed equili-
brla are more closely related to the Stackelberg leader-leader than the
Nash follower-follower game. One of the main problems is that a general
theorem, which establiahes the uniqueness of a stable solution, is not
provided by HH and might not even exist. The problem of time inconsis-
tency is closely related to the open loop and feedback equilibrium con-
cepts and was not properly discussed, so an attempt has been made to
clarify some of the issues involved. Zn particular, we argued that the
optimal and consistent strategies proposed in HH are not credible.17
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